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Consistency thou art a jewel.
-An old saying
I
INTRODUCTION
The central importance of the federal procurement dollar to the American
economy is one of the commonplaces of the day. Even more truistic is the fact
that military supply is by far the largest segment of the procurement budget. As
long ago as I95i , economist John Perry Miller observed that for more than a decade
"military appropriations and expenditures have been the principal exogenous
factors affecting the levels of employment, output, and expenditure in the economy."'
From the perspective of a law professor, Robert Braucher, the government contract
is "an institution playing a major part in the economic, social, and political life of
the nation."2 The federal contract (and its partner, the grant) is at once a technique
for obtaining the goods and services required by a proliferating government; an
economic force of great and probably growing magnitude; a political bone of con-
tention continually gnawed over by divers members of Congress, as well as the
magnet which draws assorted varieties of influence peddlers, "five-percenters," and
various other fauna to the banks of the Potomac; a matter of concern in the conduct
of American foreign relations (e.g., in the administration of the Buy American
Act); the dynamo of the scientific-technological revolution that is transforming
the structure of American society; a major factor in the economic viability of some of
the most prosperous states (e.g., California, Texas, and Arizona); the lifeblood of a
number of our largest corporations, which could not operate without it; not an
inconsiderable factor in the budgets of some of our most prestigeful universities (for
a few of them, it is probably indispensable to their viability, the counterpart of the
land grant college of the nineteenth century being the federal grant university of
this century); a device increasingly used to achieve certain regulatory ends of the
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public administration; and a means by which certain congressional statutes may be,
and are being, circumventedV
The federal contract is all that-and more. How much more cannot be stated
with any degree of precision. Perhaps more important, the actual operative impact
of federal expenditures in a quantitative sense is yet to be determined. Some
statements can be made with at least partial validity, but it is, for example, not known
precisely what the over-all economic effect of federal contracts is. (Perhaps it is
asking too much of economists to develop such conclusions; then again, it may be
that their tools are not adequate to the need.4 ) Nor is it known, on a lesser level,
what in fact the impact of federal expenditures is upon employment (to take but one
example). No one disputes that the federal contract is important, but the details are
lacking. There is, thus, a requirement for a comprehensive analysis of the federal
contract (and grant) in all of its aspects. The literature is increasing and is becoming
more sophisticated, but the field is still wide open. This symposium is a contribution
to a greater understanding of the socio-legal instrument of the public contract.
The object of this paper is to probe into one corner of the field, to raise and
to pose some of the questions which seem relevant concerning the extent to which
federal procurement policies and programs are consistent: (a) with certain basic
societal goals; (b) internally, that is, as between themselves; and (c) externally,
with other governmental objectives. Such answers as may be given and such
conclusions as may be reached are mainly tentative in nature. The subject matter
is too large and complex to be reducible to the scope of a brief article; hence the
development below will be in the form of questions. An important threshold
inquiry is the extent to which consistency may be expected in governmental policies
hammered out in the American political process.
Before tackling that question, a definition and an assumption should be stated.
Consistency, the dictionary tells us, means harmony or agreement or coherence
among the parts of a whole-in the present case, the field of public policy. The
question is whether federal procurement policies are congruous or compatible with
the spectrum of public policies-those running from, on the one end, the highest
and most abstract theories and principles of constitutional government to quite
precise and specific statutory and administrative norms, on the other end. That
question is not easily answered, except insofar as certain statutes or regulations may
conflict in their express terms. The problem is the impact of given programs or
policies-and that calls for a type of economic or sociological analysis which has
'See Miller, Administration by Contract: A New Concern for the Administrative Lawyer, 36 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 957 (g6i), as well as many of the works cited elsewhere in the present article, dealing with the
"nonprocurement" aspects of federal contracting.
'For an economist's questioning of some of the tools of economic analysis, see Os i MORoENSrERN,
ON THE ACCURACY OF ECONOMI*C OBSERVATIONS (ad ed. 1963). See also MARK S. MAssEL, COMPETITION
AND MONOPOLY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES (1962), for a development of the shortcomings of the
manner in which lawyers and economists usually approach the government-business relationship.
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not been produced by the social scientists and for which lawyers qua lawyers have
no special competence.
Emerson once said in a famous sentence that "a foolish consistency is the
hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines."
He went on to assert in his essay on Self-Reliance that "with consistency a great
soul has simply nothing to do." Great souls, whoever they may be in this workaday
world, perhaps can be so aloof, but students of the public administration should be
and lawyers must be concerned with the consistency question. Public policies can
be cancelled out, or at least rendered partially nugatory, by others not compatible
with them; and the legal rights and privileges of millions of persons (natural and
artificial) may turn on some aspect of inconsistent federal policies or be greatly
affected thereby.
The assumption is this: consistency in public policies is a Good Thing. The ideal
would be a corpus of policies, interacting and mutually exclusive, consistent one with
the other and with the entire body. This assumption is stated in an a priori fashion,
although we hasten to add that the goal is not that of Emerson's "foolish consistency,"
whatever America's sage may have meant by that label.
To what extent is that ideal attainable, given the nature of the policy-making
structure of American government? Are national policies, by some built-in aspect
of the constitutional order, fated to be at least partially inconsistent? The short
answer seems to be "yes." However, how the question is answered depends in the
first instance upon which model of the governmental decision-making process one
may have in mind. The testimony of several observers of the political process may
be cited to underpin the affirmative answer given above. Thus, economist Ewald T.
Grether, speaking in a somewhat different context, answered the consistency question
in this way:5
We need to think dearly on this matter. Our democratic federal system with its
mechanism of checks and balances and combination of centralization and decentralization
in decision making, tends inherently to allow and even make for some inconsistencies.
Furthermore, there is nothing in our constitutional protections that would guarantee full
consistency. Our protections go only to basic freedoms and rights to avoid unreasonable
discrimination. Within these broad and elastic boundaries, federal, state, and local
legislators may and do enact all sorts of contradictory legislation in the name of freedom
and public safety, the public interest and the general welfare. To some extent, the courts
set limits-but never in terms of absolutes. Historically, "political balance rather than
economic consistency has been the more powerful drive."
A moment's reflection by anyone familiar with the American constitutional system
will reveal the validity of that statement, even though it refers mainly to the diversity
of policies permitted by a federal system and does not get to the question of con-
5 Grether, Consistency in Public Economic Policy With Respect to Private Unregulated Indu1stries, 53
Am. EcoN. Rzev. PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 26 (1963). Cf. Lewis, Ambivalence in Public Policy Toward
Regulated Industries, id. at 38. See also the commentary by Professors Robert F. Lanzillotti and Jesse W.
Markham on those two papers, id. at 53, 57-
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sistency within the corpus of national governmental policies. (Should such
geographical diversity be deplored, particularly if the local policy-makers of the
federal system deal with separate constituencies? Doubtless in the nineteenth century
a number of different social and economic policies were feasible, but technological
advance and organizational growth have now changed the picture. Thus, national
American corporations, to cite but one example, are subject to a bewildering variety
of tax policies, emanating from more than Iooooo separate tax-collecting units.
In that respect, at least, the inconsistencies inherent in a federal system do produce
knotty problems as well as many inequities. The manner in which the Supreme
Court in recent years has been "nationalizing" such matters as education and
criminal administration is testimony of a basic change. So, too, has Congress tended
toward uniformity in its many grant-in-aid programs.)
Professor Emmette Redford, writing in i958, reached basically similar con-
clusions to those of Dr. Grether. He, however, spoke of national policies themselves;
in Redford's view,6 full consistency in public policy should not be expected.
In a dynamic, free, pluralistic society the balance of forces which play upon government
and which interact within it is constantly shifting. Within government, moves made
contemporaneously at different points may not be synchronized-may even have conflict-
ing effects-and moves made over a period of time may reflect great changes in purposes
and effects.
The governmental decision-making process, in Redford's opinion, is too sensitive to
divergent outside forces "to hope or to fear for the congruency of policies anticipated
in a vision of a planned society." While the stark dichotomy that Redford poses-
between rampant fluidity in policy-making, on the one hand, and a "planned society,"
on the other-certainly does not dispose of the range of choices available in any
given situation, his views as to the failure of public policy to achieve congruency are
of interest.
In i94o Professor Merle Fainsod, in discussing the federal process of regulation,
asserted that the pattern tended to be one of a fluid equilibrium, one dynamic
and always moving. Accordingly, public policy tended to be "the resultant of a
parallelogram of operative forces; the substance of public policy is the resultant
of the balance of power shifts." To Fainsod, government, far from being all-
powerful, has to account for these power struggles and in fact tends to be "deprived
of independent creative force," government- institutions being "mere pawns in a
struggle for supremacy. '" Such a system can scarcely produce consistent public
policies. Professor Fainsod possibly overstated his case a bit, although how much so
is debatable; as will be developed below, there are many who would agree with
his analysis of how decisions are made.
'Redford, The Never-Ending Search for the Public Interest, in IDEALS AND PRATIC IN PUILIC
ADMINISTRATION 1O8, 136 (Emmette S. Redford ed. 1958).
" Fainsod, Some Reflections on the Nature of the Regulatory Process, in PUBLIC POLICY: Y9RBAIoOK
or THE HA~vAD GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 297, 298 (Friedrich & Mason eds. 1940).
Cf. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," ig Ptu. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959).
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Lawyers, too, have noted inconsistencies in public policies and in legal doctrine.
There is the anomaly of the government suing itself, which seems to make sense
to the bureaucracy but which tends to perplex the outsider. Thus, in 1949 the
Supreme Court decided United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission,' in which
the Department of Justice sought to set aside a Commission ruling concerning freight
rates and reparations allegedly due to the United States (i.e., the War Department).
The executive branch of government is not such a monolith that its intramural dis-
putes do not at times get into the courts. In these instances, congruency of policy
is, again, not attained.
Furthermore, within the law itself-the "common law," i.e., the judge-made law
of any jurisdiction-inconsistencies in doctrine and in result may be found. (As be-
tween jurisdictions, they are of course obvious.) The law is not such a consistent
whole as some believe and as classical jurisprudence maintained. When case
outcomes are carefully analyzed, it may be seen that consistency in result is often
not present within the confines of a given category of law-however much the
results may be explained in judicial opinions in language that seems consistent
on its face. The application of a "jurisprudence of consequences" will reveal, it is
submitted, substantial conflicting results in cases roughly similar in their factual
situations. (This may be seen most dearly, perhaps, in the manner in which courts
interpret statutes. The running battle between legislature and court runs far back
into history, and is still going on. While at least lip service is paid to legislative
pronouncement, often a court will seem to act contrary to legislative will.)
Holmes believed that the growth of the law was in the direction of the erection
of external standards of judgment (e.g., in torts and contracts);' to the extent that
this is valid, subjectivity is supposedly eliminated and predictability (i.e., con-
sistency) in the law maintained. Even so, there seems to be at least partial validity
in the view that legal principles tend to travel in pairs of opposites. Cardozo noted
this tendency, although he limited it to a small percentage of the cases brought before
the New York Court of Appeals.0 A much more sweeping acceptance of the propo-
sition is asserted by Professor Myres S. McDougal, who maintains that a Principle
of Doctrinal Polarity operates within the technical legal doctrine of any legal orderP x
Under this principle, parallel lines of inconsistent doctrine are available to the advo-
a 337 U.S. 426 (1949), discussed in Stern, "Inconsistency" in Government Litigation, 64 HARv. L. REv.
759 (x951).
' OLIVER WENDELL HoL m, THE CoasasoN LAW 135 (i88i). See MARK DEWoLFE HowE, JUSTICE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLmES: THE PROVING YARS, z870-I882 (x963), reviewed in Touster, Holmes: The
Years of The Common Law, 64 COLUm. L. REv. 230 (z964).
'See BENynnIN N. CAnDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); THE GROWTH OF THE
L.Aw 6o (1924): "Wine-tenths, perhaps more, of the cases that come before a court are predetermined-
predetermined in the sense that they are predestined-their fate pre-established by inevitable laws that
follow them from birth to death. The range of free [judicial] activity is relatively small"; THE PARADOXES
OF LEoAL SCIENCE c. I (1928), discussing the "clash of opposites" and the antinomies of the law. Cf.
Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961).
"See, for example, McDougal, The Ethics of Applying Systems of Authority: The Balanced Opposites
of a Legal System, in Th ETmC OF PowEa: Tim INTERPLAY OF RELIGION, PmLosoPsr, AND PoLrrics 221
(Harold D. Lasswell & Harlan Cleveland eds. 1962).
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cate, and to the judicial'decision-maker, for any given factual situation. (This seems
to be obvious in constitutional adjudication, particularly when it is said that the
task of the Supreme Court is to "balance the interests" involved in a case. But
McDougal would apply it to any legal category.) The problem of the judge, then,
is to choose between these conflicting legal rules.
That view of course stands in direct contradiction to the more traditional position
of law and the judicial process-the position that for every social dispute that ends
in litigation there is an ascertainable legal rule to guide the decision. This position
once reflected legal orthodoxy, but it has long been under attack. The "pretense,"
as Dean Levi put it in 1948,12 is that "the law is a system of known rules applied
by a judge," but few, perhaps no, legal theorists of any stature now accept it. This
is not the time nor the place to discuss the question further. Suffice it to say that
for appellate courts, if not for trial courts, McDougal's position seems to offer a more
accurate description of the adjudicative process than does the traditional view. (The
adversary system of litigation may well be based on the Principle of Doctrinal
Polarity, so far as appellate litigation goes.) If so-and this is our only point-
inconsistency is imbedded in the law itself, not only as between the units of the
federal system but also within any particular jurisdiction.
One underlying reason for the existence of inconsistency in legal doctrine is the
fact that change is a "constant" in the social order. As the sociologist, W. Lloyd
Warner, recently put it, 8
The processes of change are in themselves integral parts of the social system, [and]
the very nature of the system, if it persists in being what it is, must be in continual
change. . . . Each part has within it something coming into being and something
ceasing to be. . . . Our society cannot fulfill itself and be what it is at any moment
in time unless it is always changing and becoming something else. . . . Innovations
themselves are constantly being reorganized and revaluated in terms of the old.
nothing is static ... all is movement and change.
Traditional jurisprudence, perhaps because it grew out of a relatively static society,
never came to terms with the factor of change. It is only today, when the scientific-
technological revolution is sweeping the world with hurricane winds that are altering
time-honored institutions, that legal scholars have begun to recognize and to cope
with the factor of change in the legal order.
The final statement is that of Judge Henry J. Friendly, who in the Holmes Lec-
tures in 1962 called for "better definition of standards" by federal regulatory agencies.
The agencies, in Judge Friendly's opinion, have failed to erect standards by which
decisions are made; this has led to inconsistent and even erratic decisions, which
in turn has made it highly difficult, if not impossible, for the lawyer to be able to
counsel his client. He put the matter in these terms:
14
I'EDWARD H. Lrvi, AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASONING 1 (1949).
'* W. LLOYD WARNER, THE COoPATION ;N THE EMERGENT AMRICAN SOCIETY 18 (x962).
" HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEINITION
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A prime source of justified dissatisfaction with ...federal administrative action . is
the failure to develop standards sufficiently definite to permit decisions to be fairly
predictable and the reasons for them to be understood.
The reasons for the need for better definition of standards include: the "law should
provide like treatment under like circumstances"; the "social value in encouraging
the security of transactions"; and, most importantly for present purposes, "the clear
statement of the standards the agency is applying if administrative adjudication is
to be consistent with the democratic process."
In sum, then, considerable testimony exists that federal policies, within themselves,
are at times inconsistent, that the constitutional system of federalism is productive of
a diversity of policies only accidentally consistent, and even that the law itself in the
form of judicial decisions may be said to conflict. That background will help to
put the question of the congruity of federal procurement policies in perspective. We
should not expect a higher degree of consistency in one segment-i.e., procurement-
of policy than in any other.
II
SOME CONSTITUTIONAL QuEsTIONS
The over-arching question is the compatibility of the entire federal procurement
program with the constitutional order itself and with the basic tenets of the Ameri-
can system of democracy. A beginning into this complicated problem may well
begin with what doubtless is the most quoted statement by President Eisenhower :1
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted
influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential
for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or demo-
cratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable
citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery
of defense with our peaceful methods and goals so that security and liberty may prosper
together.
Mr. Eisenhower went on to point out that another development must also be watched
and guarded against: the "domination of the nation's scholars" by federal research
and development procurement. With the vastly increased expenditure by govern-
ment in research and development, a government contract, said Mr. Eisenhower,
"becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity."
In that statement, the former President raised the specter of what Professor Harold
D. Lasswell had previously termed the "garrison state": a state "in which the
specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society."' 6 The question we
OF STANDARDS 5-6, 21 (1962), discussed in Miller, "Malaise in the Administrative Scheme": Some Ob-
servations on Judge Friendly's Call for Better Definition of Standards, 9 How. L.J. 68 (1963).
'=The statement may be found in the N.Y. Times, Jan. I8, 1961, p. 22.
HAROLD D. LAsswa.L, THE ANALYSIS OF PoLrricAL BEHAVIOUR 146 (1948). -
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pose now is the extent to which, if at all, important segments of public policy are
being made in fact, if not in theory, through the operation of a "military-industrial"
complex welded together with the legal instrument of the federal contract. (An analo-
gous question also arises in the area of science and technology, much of which is pres-
ently supported by federal money, either on contract or grant. Mr. Eisenhower, in the
statement quoted above, went on to assert that Americans should guard against
the "danger that public policy [may become] the captive of a scientific-technological
elite.") In the three years since the warnings were uttered, much has been said and
written about whether such a complex existed and, if so, what its implications were.
Some commentators have seized upon the term, "military-industrial complex," and
have maintained that not only does such a decision-making apparatus exist super-
imposed upon the constitutional structure of power in the national government, but
that the power so exercised has aspects of impropriety. Thus journalist Fred J.
Cook, in The Warfare State, sets forth an extremist view of the allegedly sinister
nature of the military-industrial complex and the manner in which it has, in his
view, been able to accelerate the arms race.17 And another journalist, Julius Duscha,
writing in Harper's Magazine,"s asserts that a substantial part of military spending
(via contract) is needless in that it contributes nothing to the nation's armed strength.
Items are procured for reasons other than military strength, including economic
growth and full employment.
The other point of view is perhaps best stated by two economists, Merton J.
Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, in their book entitled The Weapons Acquisition
Process: An Economc Analysis. 9 Published in 1962, this book is a statement of the
factors that go into choice of contractor by military contracting officers. The authors
did not address themselves to a specific analysis of the "military-industrial complex"
question but take for granted that given weapons systems that are procured are in
fact necessary for national security.
The debate, if that it be, cannot be settled here, but it does involve fundamental
aspects of the federal procurement process and the ends to which that process is
being and should be put. The question is one of the highest importance to the
"
7 FRED J. COOK, THE XVA FA-RE STATE (1962). Cf. DOUGLASS CATER, PowERt iN WAM GToN (1964).
" Duscha, Arms and the Big Money Men: Congressmen, Contractors, and the "Defense" Pork, Barrel,
Harper's Magazine, March, 1964, p. 39.
"
9 MERTON J. PECK & FREDERc M. ScllERS , THE WEAPONS AcQussrrboN Pnocass: AN EcoNoMic
ANALYSIS (5962). However, the authors do note and discuss the politics of arms acquisition insofar as
choice of contractor is concerned; for example, they state on page 95: "Since the development and pro-
duction of weapons is by far the largest single element of government spending, political variables are
obviously reflected in the weapons acquisition equation." But they conclude (page 381): "In general, we
would conclude that political considerations have not played a really major role in the choice of contractors
for advanced weapons programs. . . . [P]olitical influences seldom lead to decisions which are seriously
uneconomic from both short-run and long-run points of view."
It is fair to say that these conclusions are not buttressed with much, if any, empirical evidence.
As the text of the present article indicates, see note 23 infra, the political game is played; is it to be
considered an empty charade? Note, however, that Peck and Scherer address themselves to contractor
selection; in this respect, the question is different from that which Duscha discusses, at least in part: the
need-the requirement, in military terms-for the weapons themselves in the amounts in which they
have been procured.
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American constitutional order, and should, at the very least, be the subject of detailed
and continuing studies by all interested in the proper use of power in government.
We do no more here than pose the question, and note that it is still unanswered.
But if, as some assert, decisions are made to procure certain military supplies
("weapons systems") for reasons other than strict national security considerations, it
is appropriate to ask just what those other purposes might be. Mr. Duscha talks
about the "work-relief" nature of some of the contracts, and Professor David Riesman
has written about "military Keynesianism" in the same vein. The term "military
W.P.A." has been bandied about. The charge is that the military contract is being
used to further full-employment policies, economic growth, the continuing viability
of certain corporations, as well as other non-security purposes2 This comes
about through the operations of a relatively small group of people-a few congress-
men, some high military officers, some corporation executives, and some officials within
the executive branch. If this is the situation-and we do no more than describe the
existence of such an opinion, without subscribing to its validity or invalidity-then
it comes close to approximating what the late Professor C. Wright Mills called the
"power elite" in his model of the governmental decision-making process-without,
however, the sinister conspiracy features that Mills thought existed.
It will be recalled that Mills, in his book The Power Elite,"' maintained that
major decisions about war and peace are made, not through the formal structures
established by the Constitution, but through the deliberate actions of a small number
of persons and groups acting in a sort of interlocking directorate he called "the
power elite." This elite group, which Mills asserted really governs the United States,
come from three basic groups: corporation executives, military officers, and high-
ranking politicians. Whether such an elite exists and does exert power as Mills
maintained has been, and is being, strongly disputed. Mills failed to provide any
examples of the exercise of such power. There can be little doubt that the basis
of power in America has been markedly changed since 1787, but the new structures
of power in government cannot be wedged into such a simplistic model. What does
seem to be somewhat closer to the mark, for present purposes, is the "subgovern-
ment" that exists superimposed upon the constitutional structure with respect to the
procurement of military supplies and other large expenditures via contract (e.g.,
in space activities). Here it does not seem to be extreme to say that the federal
contract has become the biggest political "pork barrel" in our history. Vast sums
have been expended, in the words of one observer, not because of some "secret
conspiracy of malefactors," in "repeated instances of wasteful expenditure, of pro-
liferation of weapon systems without regard for military necessity, of failure to cut
: Duscha pointedly makes this charge in his article cited in note 18, supra.
'C. WRIGHT MILIs, THE POWER ELrE (z956). See WILLIAM C. MITCHELL, THE AMERICAN POLITY
c. 4 (1962) for a discussion of this and other models of the decision-making process. In analyzing the
distribution of power in the American system, Mitchell identifies two other basic models: the "popular
rule" and the "pluralistic group" models. He finds shortcomings in each of the three as an adequate
description of the manner in which decisions are'in fact made in the American polity.
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costs on projects such as the nuclear plane even after they had demonstrably failed. '22
It should be noted-and emphasized-that there is a large constituency for the
operation of the subgovernment of defense. The group includes not only those
directly employed on government contracts and their families, but the millions
of others who profit indirectly from large government payrolls in their vicinities.
Thus Cater doubtless is correct that this (to the extent it exists) is no secret con-
spiracy, but the deliberate manifestation of public policy in the modern era.
Whatever the validity of Mills' thesis and whatever power is in fact exercised by
the military-industrial complex for whatever purposes, the importance of the
question to the American constitutional order is obvious. The basic decisional
process established by the Constitution is warped to the extent that the complex
exercises power in any respect and is distorted when used for non-military purposes.
(That when used for non-military purposes it cannot be consistent with the purported
objectives of the contracting process is also obvious.) Military Keynesianism may
possibly be justified by some extreme reading of the Employment Act of 1946 and
the governmental obligations stated there. But is the gain worth the price? Not
only does the system pyramid defense costs, it expends public money for products
which at times allegedly have little or no merit militarily. This diverts public funds
from other areas of national concern-e.g., education, slum clearance, transportation-
in which the end-items do have some intrinsic merit. Defense must be had, and
it is costly, but should it be made even more so through contracting for items of
dubious value militarily?
There are a number of other questions of constitutional importance; these will
be listed with merely brief discussions.
i. The politicization of the contract-award process: To the extent (if at all) that
the thesis propounded by Cook and Duscha and Riesman is valid, the contracting
process has been and is being politicized. Law, in the terms of statute or admin-
istrative regulation, is being flouted.
Other forces are at work to turn the federal contract into some sort of political
football. There is the system whereby contract awards are announced for home-
town consumption by members of Congress prior to the official releases by the
Pentagon. This, in the words of the Wall Street Journal, is a "slick political
stratagem" that enables military officers, executive officials, and Senators and
Representatives "to bamboozle the naive" back home. The members of Congress
so favored are of course those in strategic positions on congressional committees or
are stalwart members of the faithful of the party then in political power. The
" DOUGLASS CAT R, PowER IN WASHING'rON 42-43 (r964). Cater, a journalist, discusses inter alia
what he calls the "subgovernment" of defense, and accordingly tends to agree with Duscha without
taking the gloom-and-doom view of Fred J. Cook.
The concept of "waste" in procurement has two aspects: (a) the question whether given items are
ieeded in the first place, and (b) lack of efficiency in production once an item has been put on contract.
For the most part, Cater, Duscha, and Cook discuss the first aspect.
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system is defended as a relatively harmless bit of political hocus-pocus which does
not fool the knowledgeable person in Washington.23
But it is not that harmless. Ostensibly getting a federal contract, according to
one observer, may mean the difference for some congressman between being re-
elected or not. What is at work here is a subtle erosive effect upon public confidence
in the impartiality of the contracting process. The dear public impression is that
the politician who announces a contract award is responsible for the award to a firm
in his constituency. Political campaigns are run with slogans that "so-and-so can do
more for the state" in getting federal contracts. The system is not consistent with
the standards of good government in this country. The fact that both Republicans
(under Eisenhower) and Democrats (under Kennedy and Johnson) do it is no
excuse for its existence.
2. "Contracting-out" certain managerial tasks to private contractors: For a
number of years the legal instrument of contract has been employed by government
officials, not only in the Pentagon but elsewhere (including Congress itself), to
obtain certain managerial services which were deemed not available under existing
civil service laws. Much of this has come in the research and development area,
and in advanced weapons technology. The system, described by Dean Don K.
Price as "federalism by contract," 24 is one which raises a number of difficult consti-
tutional problems. These have been discussed elsewhere, and footnote references
must suffice at this time.25 Nevertheless, it may be well to underscore one aspect
of this system: that of the intertwining of what purportedly is public and what
ostensibly is private in many of the nation's major corporations and universities as
to make the dichotomy meaningless. "Government, faced with public expectation
that it will expand its functions but not expand its bureaucracy, freely farms out to
private organizations staggering proportions of the public business."'2  The line
between public and private is being blurred. Public and private functions have
become so intertwined that in large segments of the economy business "is no longer
merely a supplier but a participant in the management and administration of a
public function." Government permeates business-and vice versa. We mentioned
this above in discussing the so-called "military-industrial complex" and emphasize it
now in noting the importance of the system of "contracting-out" and the problems
it raises.
3. The impact upon the employment relation of certain governmentally-imposed
"Wall Street journal, Oct. 14, 1963. See PEcK & ScnERE, supra note x9, at 380-82 for other
sanguine views of the politicization of the contract-award process.
"DON K. PiucE, GOVFRNMENT AND SCIENCE (1954).
"See, for example, Miller, Administration by Contract: A New Concern for the Administrative Lawyer,
36 N.Y.U. L. Rzv. 957 (1961); Symposium, Administration by Contract: An Examination of Governmental
Contracting-Out, 31 GEo. WASH. L. RI . 685 (1963); Price, supra note 24; Dupre & Gustafson, Con-
tracting for Defense: Private Firms and the Public Interest, 77 POL. Sci. Q. 161 (x962); Cleveland, The
Blurred Line Between "Public" and "Private," in ETmcs AND BIGNESS: SCIENTIFIC, ACADEMIc, R LIGOous,
POLITICAL, AND Mr.rrARY at xxiii (Harlan Cleveland & Harold D. Lasswell eds. 1962).
" Cleveland, supra note 25, at xxv.
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norms. These standards may emanate from Congress (e.g., in such labor legislation
as the Walsh-Healey Act and the Davis-Bacon Act) or they may be creations
of the Executive (as in the industrial security program and the mandatory non-
discrimination-in-employment clause) ,27 Whatever their origin, their cumulative
effect is intervention into the employment relation, which by statute is otherwise left
to the private volition of collective bargaining, and thereby determination to some
extent of who shall be hired by contractors and the wages and hours that may be
paid. As such, they represent, whatever their individual or collective merits may be
thought to be, important controls upon the operations of the federal contractor,
controls which make up a system of regulation by contract. Less than thirty years
ago the power of government so to condition its contracts was a question of con-
siderable constitutional importance. The 194o decision by the Supreme Court in
Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.,"' which seems to say and has been interpreted by
executive branch officials to mean that any conditions deemed desirable by one of
the political branches of government may be attached to federal contracts, is the
cornerstone of the legal authority for the practice.
Perkins involved the validity of the Walsh-Healey Act and administrative
determinations of minimum wages made thereunder. The Court treated the
problem as one of justiciability and decided that a contractor (or disappointed
bidder, for that matter) did not have the requisite "standing" to challenge the
validity of the Secretary of Labor's order. In an opinion far from noteworthy for
its logic-the finding of lack of standing is a classic case of circular reasoning-Mr.
Justice Black made a statement which has since been often cited to uphold placement
of mandatory clauses in federal contracts: "Like private individuals and businesses,
the government enjoys the unrestricted power to produce its own supplies, to
determine those with whom it will deal, and to fix the terms and conditions upon
which it will make needed purchases." Thus, the nondiscrimination-in-employment
clause, under the terms of which the contractor must and does promise not to
discriminate in his employment practices because of race, color, creed, or national
origin, has been a part of federal contracts since 1942-and wholly by executive
provenience. So, too, with the labor clauses, although they are of legislative origin.
A judicial determination on the merits has never been made on any of them; thus
"r The labor legislation was, for the most part, enacted in the 193os when it was thought that Congress
did not have power under article I, section 8 of the Constitution to regulate in certain areas of business.
As such, the statutes are hangovers from the period of limited congressional power; but they have never
been repealed and still exist on the statute books and in the contract clauses. Included inter alia are:
the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, 41 U.S.C. § 35 et seq.; the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276(a);
the Eight-Hour Law, 40 U.S.C. § 321 et seq. For the most part, these statutes tend to be anachronisms;
it is questionable whether they serve any useful purpose today.
Other labor standards are derived from the Executive's power to condition contracts, upheld (according
to officials in the executive branch) in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., infra note 28. The nondiscrimination-
in-employment clause and its implementation may bc found in i CCH, Gov'T Cor. REP. 6300 et seq.
(1964); the industrial security program is discussed infra note 29.
See Miller, Government Contracts and Social Control: A Preliminary Inquiry, 41 VA. L. REV. 27
(1955); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HAiv. L. REv. 1595 (196o).
28310 U.S. 113 (940).
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the power of government to condition its expenditures might be said to be an un-
resolved constitutional question, at least as to its outward limits, even though in
practice the usual contract is loaded with such examples of the regulatory use of
the contracting power.
The most important challenge to the power to condition contracts came in
Greene v. McElroy, 9 involving the industrial security program. Instituted after
the Second World War to deal with the handling of contractor personnel considered
to be "security risks," it was challenged in the Greene case by a person who had
been discharged by a federal contractor on government order after findings that
he had associated at one time with persons known to be members of the Communist
Party. The Court, in a long and rambling opinion by Chief Justice Warren which
discussed due process and the lack of confrontation by Greene of the witnesses
against him, based its decision on the finding that the program was not authorized
by statute nor by executive order; it, accordingly, held that Greene's discharge was
improper. (In the second Greene case, decided in 1964, the Court held that he was
entitled to monetary restitution, the Pentagon having refused to make payment to
him despite the first decision.) The defect of authority was soon cured, in the eyes
of Pentagon officials at least, by the issuance of Executive Order IO865, dated
February 2o, 1960.30
Another example of the control power of government via contract conditions
bears mention, although it has not as yet occasioned litigation-and may well not.
Some 1963 regulations issued by the Atomic Energy Commission constitute controls
not only of on-the-job activities of contractor personnel, but also regulate them
during their off-duty time:31
Sec. 9-12.5404. Outside Employment of Contractor Employees.
Employees of a contractor are entitled to the same rights and privileges with respect
to outside employment as other citizens. Therefore, there is no general prohibition
against employees having outside employment. However, no employee of a contractor
performing work on a full-time basis under an AEC contract shall engage in employment
outside his official hours of duty or while on leave if such employment will
(a) in any manner interfere with the proper and effective performance of the duties of
his position;
(b) appear to create a conflict of interests situation, or
(c) appear to subject the AEC or the contractor to public criticism or embarrassment.
Such a regulation raises several intriguing questions. There is, of course, the
initial hurdle of ambiguity to be clarified: who-an employee or the contractor-is
"performing work on a full-time basis"? If the regulation refers merely to an
employee hired by a given contractor to work full-time on AEC work, it is one thing;
but it is quite another if the contractor is the referent, for then the regulation
2D 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
"The industrial security program is delineated in 2z CCH, Gov'T CoTr. REP. t 86oo et seq. (2964).
The second Greene case is Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. i49 (1964).
81 28 Fed. Reg. 2350-2353 (March 12, 1963). Emphasis is added.
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appears to cover all employees of a contractor, whether or not they are individually
working on an AEC contract. Consider what this does to, say, a university with
an AEC contract. If the latter interpretation is correct, then all who draw salaries
from the university could have their off-duty, outside work supervised by the AEC;
the power, at least, is there, for under section 9-7.5oo6-6(c) of the same AEC regula-
tions, the contractor must establish "such standards and procedures as are necessary
to implement" the provisions of section 9-12.54, including the above-quoted segment,
and these are subject to the approval of the AEC. Under this interpretation, any
faculty member of the university which has an AEC contract is subject to the
control of the AEC in his outside activities.
But if section 9-12.5404 refers only to the employee doing work full-time on an
AEC contract, then what is involved is that his off-duty employment is in fact
severely curtailed. What does "public criticism or embarrassment" mean? Does
someone who "moonlights" a bit by driving a taxi subject his employer or the AEC
to criticism or embarrassment? Note further that it applies to employees "on leave"
from their principal employment; suppose a law professor who happens to be doing
work on an AEC contract (we know of no such contracts) takes a leave of absence
to engage in civil rights activities as a participant with the Congress for Racial
Equality. Would this violate the regulation? Certainly there would likely be some
"public criticism or embarrassment."
These are hypothetical problems, and perhaps may be dismissed as unreal.W 2 But
they do represent control not only of the employment conditions of a federal con-
tractor, but also of what employees do with their nonwork hours. One need not
be thought to be a doom-crier to maintain that such controls as the AEC regula-
tion could have great significance for what Clark Kerr, President of the University
of California, calls the "federal grant multiversity."33  Already the economic
viability of a number of our most prestigeful universities depends upon a continuing
flow of federal funds in contracts and grants (e.g., Cal Tech, MIT, the University
of California, Yale), for, as Kerr notes, the bulk of federal funds via contract and
grant have been concentrated in less than twenty institutions 4 Just, as will be
discussed below, the military services find it expedient to deal with a few big
businesses, so the science and technology aspects of government find it desirable
to deal with a baker's dozen "nonprofit" organizations. The point is not that this
is ipso facto wrong or improper; it is, rather, that the federal government has,
perhaps by design, enhanced the wealth of the already rich and prosperous uni-
versities and, in so doing, has made it possible for control via conditions attached
to contracts and grants. Kerr discounts the idea that controls are now imposed,
but the potential is there nevertheless.
" We know of no application of these regulations to contractors or their employees. The control
power is present, nonetheless, available for use should someone in the AEC consider a situation to warrant
it-
' CLARK Kam, Tim UsEs op rr UNisvmar (x963).
Ib d.
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The constitutional problems of conditioning contracts refer not only to the
general power to do so and in what instances; this, as stated above, seems to be an
unresolved question in the sense that there has yet to be a definitive statement
by the Supreme Court. Also involved are separation-of-powers questions: can
the President act without prior congressional approval? Can he act in the face of
congressional consideration of, but failure to reach a vote upon, certain issues?
These latter questions are present in the constitutional basis of contractual condi-
tions of purely executive derivation; they, too, may be said to be unresolved constitu-
tional matters. Their consistency with the Constitution is still to be decided. Over
and above the legal question, however, is the extent to which controls are placed
upon the activities of what hitherto have been considered to be private organizations.
A number of observers have noted the progressive blurring of the line between what
is public and what purportedly is private, but not all have the bland assurance of
President Kerr that all is well.
4. Presidential impounding of appropriated funds. Another unsettled constitu-
tional question is the extent to which appropriations by Congress for designated
purposes may be impounded, at least in part, by the Executive. Such a practice runs
back as far as 1942 when President Roosevelt refused, in the interests of national
defense, to spend certain sums.3 5 Each President since then has asserted similar
power, although substantial doubt exists both in Congress and within the executive
branch of the legal basis for, and extent of, that power. The problem, of course,
lies in refusing to contract for certain items or services deemed desirable by Congress,
and thus differs somewhat from other instances in this categorization when the
problem is whether the award of contracts is inconsistent with certain policies.
Here the question is the extent to which the refusal to award contracts is inconsistent
with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. (It is the subject of a forthcoming
article by the senior author of this paperY6)
5. State taxation and regulation of federal contractors. An unstated though none-
theless existent policy of the national government is to avoid state taxation and
regulation of its contractors. The result is a direct impact upon the federal system
in that substantial segments of the business community are withdrawn, at least in
part, from state power over them. The Supreme Court has, by and large, gone
along with this policy, and has thereby given it constitutional legitimacy. The last
authoritative pronouncements came in 1963, in Paul v. United States,37 and in I958,
in Murray v. City of Detroitf8 In Paul, it was held that California could not fix
the price of milk sold to the United States, even though the price-fixing scheme was
"
5 For an account, see ROBERT Asm WALLACE, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FEDERAL SPENDING 144-47
(i96o).
"6 Miller, Presidential Power to Impound Appropriated Funds: An Exercise in Constitutional Decision
Making (forthcoming).
S 371 U.S. 245 (1963). See Miller, State Power Over Federal Contractors: A Problem in Federalism,
xx VAND. L. REv. 175 (x957).
as 355 U.S. 489 <1958).
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part of an otherwise constitutional program, while in Murray the Court, for the
first time, held that federal property could in some situations be taxed locally.
Whatever the merits of these decisions (surely there is ground for questioning
the desirability of such a complete denial of state power over the federal contractor)
the consequence is that the contracting system has an adverse impact upon the
federal system. It is diluted, and central power enhanced, to the extent that the
taxing and regulatory power of state governments over businesses within their juris-
dictions is denied. With the procurement budget at the size it has been and likely
will continue to be, this impact is no small factor in the continuing erosion of tradi-
tional American federalism.
An allied situation comes in the award of federal contracts, particularly in
research and development (R&D) which in recent years has displayed a pattern
of certain states receiving the bulk of such awards with others getting little or none.
For whatever reasons, California has received and continues to receive almost half
of the R&D contracts awarded by the federal government; the remainder arc
concentrated in other states mainly along the East and West coastsY9 The Middle
West gets few, a situation which has caused anguished reactions from politicians
from that area. The situation is a serious one, the problem vexatious; in the
words of the House Select Committee on Research: "there is a growing feeling of
concern that more than a generous share" of the R&D funds is "concentrated in a
handful of states." "It is clear," said the Committee, "that our national security
must not be impaired by regional considerations in research and development ex-
penditures." However, the Committee went on to note that it is "equally clear
that, to an extent perhaps not yet accurately measurable, these same expenditures
have an extraordinarily powerful impact on the educational, industrial, and employ-
ment sectors of every region's vitality."40
Thus contracting officials, for what are doubtless irreproachable military reasons,
persist in treating the federal contract as any other contract and refuse to face up
to the imbalances which occur in the economy. But the federal contract, when
viewed institutionally, is not to be equated with the consensual agreements of
private parties; it is something far more than that. Nevertheless, how the question
of imbalance in contract awards is to be resolved is difficult to foretell. What can
be said with accuracy is that the future will bring increased controversy over where
contracts should be placed and where other federal money should be spent. The
day is not far off when governmental officials will have to come to grips with
the problem of regionalism and do something about it. Until they do so, the in-
consistency of the federal procurement program with a strong and viable federal
system may be shown on two fronts: first, in the area of state power over the
contractor, and second, in the concentration of contract awards geographically.
"' For a discussion of the manner in which space. contracts are concentrated geographically, see the
N.Y. Times, March i, x964, p. I.
10 STAFr OF HousE SELECT Comm. ox GOVRNMENT RESEARCH, 88TH CoNG., 2D SEss., F1RST PROOnEss
REPORT, FnDm.AL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 8 (Comm. Print x964).
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This has been an impressionistic view of the constitutional aspect of the con-
sistency question so far as federal contracting is concerned. No attempt has been
made to make an exhaustive listing of all constitutional problems nor to probe into
any one of them in depth. The effort has been to pose the question and to suggest
the need for deep and systematic research and analysis. By way of conclusion, it
is valid to state that the system of federal contracting, as it has arisen and as it is
now administered, raises some basic and troublesome problems going to the core
of the problem of government in the modern age. This does not mean, however,
that such problems are insurmountable and that they will not be resolved in a
manner which will preserve the values inherent in a free society. After all, the
American Constitution has always been a "living" document and has survived major
changes before 1 Ancient ways and usages do not necessarily retain the wisdom
that once was behind them; it is, as Holmes once remarked, odious to have no
reason other than history to do a particular thing. The fact of new practices and
procedures should not, merely because of their novelty, cause undue concern. In
other words, inconsistency of present governmental practice (and constitutional
doctrine) with the past does not in and of itself condemn it.
Nevertheless the fact remains that new ways of meeting problems, which by
and large have been superimposed upon the constitutional order of the 1787 vintage,
can and do raise age-old problems of constitutionalism, i., of "good" government,
of limited government, of ways to prevent despotism, of the preservation of human
freedom. Thus while inconsistency with the past is to be expected in the practices of
government, at least on some level, imbedded in the list of problems set forth above
are challenges to the very nature of a free society. The dangers against which Mr.
Eisenhower warned have not disappeared; if anything, they have become more evi-
dent. Saying this is not to denigrate those who labor in the procurement process;
but it is well to remember the words of Mr. Justice Brandeis:42
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Govern-
ment's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion
of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the in-
sidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.
III
INTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES
It is convenient, in analyzing the federal procurement program for instances of
inconsistency, to divide the policies that affect government contracting into two
classes-internal and external. Those statutes and regulations, such as the small
business set-asides, the labor surplus preferences, and the Buy American Act, whose
'
1 See Miller, Notes on the Concept of the "Living" Constitution, 31 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 881 (1963).
"2 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (disenting opinion).
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primary implementation is through the procurement program, may be considered
as parts of the procurement program itself, thus internal forces. On the other
hand, those statutes, regulations, and policies, such as the antitrust laws, free
trade, and the civil service laws, whose purposes and primary effects are independent
of the procurement program may be considered as external forces having conse-
quences for the program (and vice versa). These classifications are not so neat
as to preclude some overlap. They are desirable, however, primarily because, in
attempting to resolve conflicts between the operative effects of various policies, resolu-
tion may be easier among the policies classified as internal than among the external.
Internal policies are theoretically designed to complement the objects of procurement,
though admittedly their primary purposes may be directed elsewhere. While some
internal policies, such as those to be discussed here, are enacted as amendments to,
or sections of, statutes aimed at aiding small business or alleviating unemployment
or the like, they are written as part of the procurement-contract requirements and are
included in the Armed Services Procurement Regulation4 On the other hand,
external policies are seldom enacted with any analysis given to their effects on
procurement laws or policies; thus, there is no prior attempt at resolving possible
inconsistencies. Indeed, resolution conceivably might result in the purposes of one
or the other being completely frustrated.
A "functional" analysis seems desirable, that is, one looking to the purposes of
these statutes and regulations, rather than solely to their explicit language. It is
their effects that are of interest-their impact in the social order. In federal con-
tracting, the primary function is to acquire and dispose of property and use and
dispense services; but various others exist. The functions of public policy imple-
mentation, involving such issues as undue influence and regionalism, have been
examined earlier; here we concentrate only on the primary function of federal
contracting, proceeding on the assumption that its ultimate object is "efficiency"-
obtaining goods and services of the highest possible quality, at the lowest possible
cost, and, particularly in Defense Department purchasing, with the speediest possible
delivery. These objectives are not attained in any situation where a product
or service must be purchased through methods which hamper efficiency. There
are many situations where efficiency does not seem to be the most pressing desire.
It is these which create inconsistencies.
Our focus initially will be upon the small business program, "full employment"
policy, and the Buy American Act. The primary purpose of each of these policies,
as distinct from their subsidiary melding, or lack of it, with the basic procurement
objective, will be examined in order to ascertain how successfully it has been
achieved.
"See, e.g., Small Business Act, 72 Stat. 384 (1958), x5 U.S.C. §§ 631-47 (1958), implemented by
32 C.F.R. 5§ 1.700-.708 (Supp. 1963).
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A. The Small Business Program
Political pressures, plus a genuine concern that the existence of the small business
firm as a viable and important segment of the economy was seriously threatened,
led to measures during World War II to provide an ever-expanding program of
technical and financial assistance to smaller firms. Of course, in one sense the anti-
trust laws were aimed, at least partially, in the same direction. In any event, they
were viewed by adherents of the classical-economic goal of a broadly-based
supplier program as the most important bulwark against the evils of concentration.
But these statutory measures were ineffective in the government contract area,
chiefly, perhaps, because the monopolistic prohibitions of the Sherman Act44 do not
operate against the government.45 Therefore, new approaches were sought, begin-
ning in 1941 with the establishment of a unit in the Department of Commerce to
study the small business segment of the nation's industries, determine the problems
encountered by smaller firms because of their size, and plan a program of assistance.
During the next eleven years the unit progressed through several stages, culminating
in 1953 with the statutory creation of the first independent agency charged with the
duty of promoting small business interests.' During this period the importance
of the government contract as a method of promoting small business was recognized.
Aid to small business, accordingly, is a goal set forth in both the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 194747 and the Federal Property and Administrative Services
Act of I9494 --"it is the declared policy of the Congress that a fair proportion of
the total purchases and contracts for supplies and services for the Government shall
be placed with small-business concerns."'49
In the late 195oS, at the very time when oligopoly, if not monopoly, was dom-
inating the economy (and even acquiring some intellectual approval), the Congress,
perhaps in a last-ditch effort, extolled the merits of the "little man" and sought to
counter the trend of economic development through expansion of the Small
Business Administration's powers and duties. The Small Business Act of 1958
reaffirmed that free competition, "the essence of the American economic system,"
could not be realized "unless the actual and potential capacity of small business is
encouraged and developed." ' The Small Business Administration (SBA) became
the principal spokesman within the government for the administration of efforts
to insure small-firm receipt of "a fair share" of government contracts. Section
fifteen of the new statute empowered the SBA and contracting officers to "set-aside"
"26 Stat. 2o9 (s89o), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1958).
'5 See, e.g., Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. X27, 135-36
(596i).
" See generally Barnes, What Government Efforts Are Being Made to Assist Small Business?, 24 L&w
& CN'rFMs. PROB. 3-8 (1959).
"' 62 Star. 21 (948), as amended, zo U.S.C. §§ 23OI-2613 (1958), as amended, so U.S.C.A. H§ 2304-
268X (Supp. 1963).
63 Star. 393 (949), as amended, 41 U.S.C. §1 25x-6o (1958).
"Id. at 393, 41 U.S.C. at S 25 2(b).
o Small Business Act § 2(a), 72 Stat. 384 (1958). 15 U.S.C. § 631 (1958).
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procurements for competition solely among small business concerns,t1 defined, by
regulation, generally as any firm employing less than 500 persons?
The basic objective of these measures is economic viability of the small business
concern. Since the percentage of government contracts let to such firms is only
one segment of the total program, this objective could possibly be achieved, while
as the same time removing the "special privileges" accorded small firms and probably
foreclosing their access to most primary or secondary government contracts, through
such existing measures as tax benefits, loans, and investment credits. However,
all of these depend upon a demand for goods or services created by sources outside
of governmental control, whereas, through the contract mechanism, the government,
at least theoretically, is able to expand the demand for small business output. The
most direct form of government assistance to small business appears to be the pro-
curement contract. Consequently, a decrease or even leveling in the percentage of
government contracts being let to small firms, either immediately or ultimately
through subcontracts, would compel the conclusion that the small business program
has been at least a partial failure.
The latest available statistics suggest that such a leveling or moderate decrease
has indeed occurred, although some observers have professed to note an upward
trend. Nevertheless, there is little dispute that in recent years the small business
"share" of government purchasing contracts has declined despite vigorous legislative
and administrative efforts to stay this tendency. In fiscal year 1954, the Department
of Defense's military procurement expenditures totaled over $ix billion, and by
fiscal year i96x that amount nearly doubled. Yet during the same period the small
business "share" dropped from 25.3 per cent to 15.9 per cent." In fiscal year i96i,
oo companies received 74.2 per cent of military procurement expenditures. Though
this share declined almost two percentage points in fiscal year x962, the drop is
probably attributable, not to a reversal of the trend, but "principally to a phasing
521 72 Stat. 395 (1958), 15 U.S.C. § 644 (1958), which states in pertinent part:
"Small business concerns ... shall receive any award . . .for the sale of government property, as
to which it is determined by the Administration and the contracting procurement or disposal
agency (i) to be in the interest of maintaining or mobilizing the nation's full productive capacity,
(2) to be in the interest of war or national defense programs, (3) to be in the interest of assuring
that a fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts for property and services for the govern.
ment are placed with small business concerns, or (4) to be in the interest of assuring that a fair
proportion of the total sales of government property be made to small-business concerns .... "
" Congress had defined a small business as one "which is independently owned and operated and
which is not dominant in its field of operation," Small Business Act § 3, 72 Stat. 384 (1958), 15 U.S.C.
§ 632 (1958), but left the "detailed definition" to "the Administrator." Ibid. Pursuant to this the
Small Business Administration promulgated regulations establishing a small business firm in government
procurement as one "whose number of employees does not exceed 500 persons," 13 C.F.R. § 121.3-8(a) (i)
(1963), or xooo persons in "cases where there is a high concentration of output in a few large companies
and there are a limited number having 500 or fewer employees," id. at § I21.3-8(c)(i). Recently while
maintaining these two general categories, the Small Business Administration detailed separate requirements
for different industries and in some cases now defines a small firm in terms of "average annual receipts"
or output. 13 C.F.R. § 121-3-8 (Supp. 1964).
63 Office of Secretary of Defense, Military Prime Contract Awards and Subcontract Payments, July-
September 1962, in Suss, Small Business and Government Procurement z96i, 53 MEaCEIr L. RFv. 356
(I96X-62).
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down in some aircraft programs... and an increase in the procurement of equipment
for the Army modernization program."5  Those who foretell a contrary trend
also mark the rise of the small business "share" of Defense Department procurement
in fiscal 1962 to 17.7 per cent;55 however, this is still a relative decline since 1954;
more importantly, for the first half of fiscal year 1963, the small-firm total of prime
military contracts dropped $15.5 million dollars while the total of all prime military
contracts rose $724.5 million.56
There appear to be several related causes for this continued low percentage.
Discarding for the moment a possible lack of vigorous Small-Business-Act imple-
mentation by the government and a reluctance by large firms to share the profits,
the major cause appears to be the inconsistency between the small business program
and the requirements of government procurement, particularly military weapons
systems and research and development. The quality, speed, and surety of delivery
demanded for national security reasons have often necessitated virtual abandonment
of contract-letting in this area to smaller firms.
The two major federal procurement statutes require bids to be let by "formal
advertising," with "negotiation" the exception.57 At one time the only exceptions
were public exigencies or emergencies and contracts for personal services,5" but the
list has been expanded to a total of fifteen (seventeen in purchase contracts of
the armed services and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration),
including the very important field of research and development.59 The basic
preference for formal advertising, we are told, should lead to more competition
and perhaps thereby aid the small-businessman. Senator William Proxmire
has recently restated the standard belief that "with formally advertised bidding small
business gets up to 50 per cent, whereas they get io per cent of the negotiated."6°
The 196o Report of the Subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee urged that
"every effort should be made to use the time-honored, formally advertised, full
" STAFF OF SuBco1tatM. ON DEFENSE PROCUREMENT, JOINT ECONOMIC CoiM., 88TH CONG., IST SESS.,
BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON ECONOmiC ASPECTS OF MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY 9 (Comm. Print
1963) [hereinafter cited as BACKGROUND MATERIAL].
"ld. at Io.
" 6 1963 GOV'T CoNT. REP. 8o,o61.
" Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 §:z(c), 62 Stat. 21 (948), as amended, io U.S.C.
§ 2304 (1958), as amended, xo U.S.C.A. § 2304(a)(14)(g) (Supp. 1963). Federal Property and Admin-
istrative Services Act § 302(c), 63 Stat. 393 (1949), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 252(c) (1958). Often
competitive bidding is used as a synonym for formal advertising; however, a recent article has contended
that, at least prior to 1962, "competition is required in negotiated procurement. The law removes
formality only in the means by which public procurement for the national government is achieved."
McClelland, Negotiated Procurement and the Rule of Law: The Fiasco of Public Law 87-653, 32 FoRDWm4
L. REV. 411, 425 (1964)-
8 REV. STAT. § 3709 (1875)-
"Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 § 2(c), 62 Stat. 21 (1958), as amended, 1o U.S.C. § 2304
(1958), as amended, Io U.S.C.A. § 2304(a)(I4),(g) (Supp. 1963). Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act § 302(c), 63 Stat. 393 (1949), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 252(c) (1958).
ao Hearings on Impact of Military Supply and Service Activities on the Economy Before the Sub-
committee on Defense Procurement of the Joint Economic Committee, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 37 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as 1963 Hearings].
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competitive bid procedure... in lieu of the subjective negotiation procedures"...
[since] genuine written bids ... permit the free forces of competition to play ...
Presumably this "free play" as a resultant of formally advertised bids is designed
to aid small businesses.
However, it is not at all clear that formal advertising does aid in contract
dispersion among small as well as large businesses. Because of such factors as (x)
placing of high dollar-amount military orders in industries, such as aircraft, which
are already dominated by large corporations; (2) incapability of many smaller firms
to handle orders for complex or heavy equipment; (3) availability in large corpora-
tions of larger resources for publicity and lobbying; (4) greater reliability of larger
firms because of past experience and know-how; and (5) greater number of execu-
tives from large corporations who are able to do work as government employees
without compensation, advertised bids in military procurement result in most con-
tracts being awarded to large corporations. Furthermore, formal advertising requires
at least six ingredients: a foolproof specification; prior public announcement; award
primarily on price; automatic rejection of any bid which differs in any significant
detail from the invitation; public opening and reading; and award on a firm fixed-
price or fixed-price with "escalation basis."' 3 Otherwise, the contract must be negoti-
ated. Because of the rigidity of these requirements, the percentage of negotiated bids
in military procurement has remained very high (86.6 per cent of the total dollar
amount in the first half of fiscal year 1964)" 4 and, in fact, has increased since a low
of 82.6 per cent in 1957.5
A substantial portion of the negotiated contracts-from fifty-seven per cent in
1956 to 72.3 per cent in i96166--are used in the purchase of major "hard goods"
(aircraft, missile systems, ships, tanks, weapons, ammunition, electronic and com-
munication equipment). The purchase of these usually requires the "weapons
system" type of procurement, whereby a single contractor is vested with the re-
sponsibility for developing and producing the end-items, including purchasing all
needed components, and then either assembling the item in a government facility or
arranging for a private prime contractor to assemble the components. As the prime
6 Suacom .. om DEFENSE PROCUREMENT, JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 86TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY 46 (Comm. Print 196o).
" Id. at 23.
"BACKGROUND MATERIAL 75 (Statement of Secretary of Defense McNamara, App. 2).
" 6 x964 Gov'T CoNT. REP. 8o,o6i (Summary of Directorate for Statistical Services, Office of
Secretary of Defense, Military Prime Contract Awards and Subcontract Payments, July-December 1963).
This total does represent a slight drop from 87.0 per cent during fiscal year 1963. Ibid.
"'Sucomm. ON DEPENsE PROCUREMENT, JoINT ECONOMIC COMM., 88mT CONG., isr Sass., REPORT o
IMPACT OF MILITARY SUPPLY AND SERVICE ACTIVITIEs ON THE ECONOMY 4 (Comm. Print x963) [herein-
after cited as DouGoAs REPORT].
It should be noted that the newly created Defense Supply Agency has had some success in spurring
competitive procurement for "standard, common use" items. In the first six months of its existence 40.4
per cent of its procurement was by formal advertising. Ibid. By the end of the first three-quarters of
fiscal year 1963 this percentage had climbed to 44.8 per cent. Id. at 35.
"6 Office of Secretary -of Defense, Military Prime Contract Awards and Subcontract Payments, July-
September 1962, in Suss, supra note 53, at 359.
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contractor has responsibility for producing the end product, he is given a large
measure of independence over the selection of his subcontractors and suppliers.
This power, in the opinion of the Congressional Small Business Committee, has
been exercised to the detriment of the small-businessman.!r
One major area for normal use of negotiated contracts is research and develop-
ment0 Three-fourths of all military research and development is accomplished
through contracts, totalling billions of dollars annually. The Armed Services Pro-
curement Act, while not expressly granting research authority, is the statute under
which the Department of Defense awards research and development contracts.
These contracts were made an express exception to the formal advertising require-
ments due to the impossibility of drawing "up specifications in advance and
[making] firm fixed-price contracts with selection based on price alone." 9  Com-
pared to production contracting, research and development contracting entails more
vague quality preferences, performance rather than design specifications, tentative
delivery schedules, and, of course, no assurance of product completion, at least in
the form contemplated. Assistant Secretary of Defense Morris has stated:
In research and development and in the production of aircraft and missile systems, we
have very limited opportunities to make awards on the basis of price competition. These
two segments accounted for $12.3 billion, or 44 per cent, of our procurement awards in
fiscal year 1962. Research and development can rarely be placed under a firm fixed-price
contract, which is a requisite to price competition. There are several reasons for this.
First, the unknowns and the risks are far too great for most contractors to assume, and
second, we are buying creative effort where rare technical competence and technical
concepts of bidders are of greater importance than price alone, which is at best a matter
of estimation in such work. In these situations an undue emphasis on cost reduction may
deteriorate the quality of the development. Third, the production of new aircraft and
missile systems cannot be economically procured on the basis of price competition due
to the high start-up costs, and the leadtime required to introduce a new production source
after a long period of development.70
Thus selective negotiation is almost an imperative here. Twenty-five per cent of the
research and development in the United States is through the government "con-
tracting-out" program, which has reached six billion dollars per year-194 per cent
of all negotiated procurement in fiscal 1962.1
While approximately eight per cent of the Department of Defense research and
development funds go to education and nonprofit organizations,72 forty-three per cent
7 See H.R. REP'. No. 271, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 151 (959). It has been charged recently
that there is no express authority for the weapons system type of procurement. See McClellan'd, supra
note 57, at 415.
tpThis broad phrase encompasses concept studies, feasibility studies, design and development, proto-
type production, production engineering, and final production.
' 1963 Hearings 21 (remarks of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara).70 1963 Hearings 4r. (Emphasis omitted.)
7 1 BACKGROUND MATERIAL 40.
12 OFFICE OF THE S'CR.ETARY OF DEFENSE, Fiv YEAR TRENDS IN DEFENSE PROCUREMfENT x958-1962,
at 6o (x963) [hereinafter cited as PROCuREmENT TRENDS].
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are placed with industrial contractors using their own facilities."3  Usually these have
been the almost exclusive province of the manufacturing titans, particularly when
complex weapons systems such as the TFX aircraft are desired. Some critics, in-
cluding Professor Eugene V. Rostow, have maintained that research and develop-
ment is handled better and cheaper by small firms.O4 Nevertheless, weapon systems
development contracts, because of their very size and complexity, must be let to
large prime contractors in the hope that subcontracts will be parceled out to smaller
firms through the Small Business Subcontracting Program, administered under
section 8(b) (5) of the Small Business Act75 and implemented by the Armed Services
Procurement Regulation. All government contracts valued at over $5ooooo must
include a "Small Business Subcontracting Program" clauseYP This provides,
among other things, that prior to the letting of a subcontract where there has been
no small firm solicitation, the prime contractor must receive the contracting officer's
consent, if such is required by a "Subcontracts" clause. The latter will investigate
the availability of small firms and may require their consideration. However, the
effectiveness of this provision appears to be greatly weakened by a clause which reads
that "in no case will the procurement action be held up when to do so would, in
the Contractor's judgment, delay performance under the contract.""7 Thus the very
person to whom the contracting officer must apply pressure has a partial option to
negate the effect of this pressure. And often, due to the prime contractor's natural
inclination to produce as many subsystems and components as possible (thus re-
taining the profit), even though available small firms might produce them faster,
better, and at a lower cost, the subcontracting program, like the set-aside program,
has largely failed.
It is, in brief summary, entirely valid to say that, in spite of governmental efforts
to aid small business, there is a marked concentration of government contracts in
large corporations. The very existence of this concentration seems to demonstrate
that if the small business program achieved the full measure of its proponents'
original expectations, assuming the concentration to result from competitive in-
efficiencies in a free market, a higher total cost basis would necessarily be introduced
into the government procurement program.
B. The Program to Alleviate Unemployment
Chronic and persistent unemployment and underemployment has been a specter
on the American economic scene since the depression days of the i93os. Several
approaches have been suggested as solutions. Most have been founded on the con-
Lazure, Why Research and Development Contracts Are Distinctive, 17 FED. B.J. 255, 259 (1957).
"
4 E. V. Rosrow, PANNING FOR FREEDOM 268 (z959).
7572 Stat. 390 (1958), 15 U.S.C. § 637(b)(5) (1958), as amended, x5 U.S.C. § 637(d) (Supp. III,
1961).1632 C.F.R. § I.707-3 (b) (Supp. z963). "Prime contractors who are to be awarded contracts that
do not exceed $5O,OOO but which, in the opinion of the purchasing activity, offer substantial sub-
contracting possibilities, shall be urged to accept the clause." Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
"'Id. at § 1.7 07- 3 (b)( 5 ).
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cept of federal "pump-priming" as the most immediately effective stimulant to
economic prosperity sufficient to soak up or redistribute surplus labor. One of the
more recent means developed to pump federal government funds into the economy
in the specific areas of "persistent" or "substantial" unemployment 7 is to designate
certain geographic areas of the country where labor surpluses exist for preference
in the award of procurement contracts and subcontracts. Firms in these areas are
preferred so far as is consistent with efficient performance and at prices no higher
than those obtainable elsewhere.
The program was launched in the early fifties by Secretary of Defense George C.
Marshall, in a directive to the Secretaries of the military departments, seeking to
effectuate a broadened mobilization base.7 His action was reinforced by the
Office of Defense Mobilization Policy No. i SO and by a presidential directive on
manpower mobilization, requesting that "wherever feasible ... production facilities,
contractors, and significant subcontractors . . . be located""' at existing sources of
manpower. The Department of Defense initially resisted, contending that the
requirement in the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 that "awards shall be
made.., to the responsible bidder whose bid ... will be most advantageous to the
Government, price and other factors considered"8' 2 prohibited it from awarding a
contract to other than the lowest qualified bidder. However, after the Comptroller
General reversed his earlier position and validated the payment of price differ-
entials, 3 the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization issued Defense Manpower
Policy No. 4 (DMP-4 ) .s" Under the original wording of DMP-4, both the
Defense Department and the General Services Administration were authorized to
award bids in designated unemployment areas even if the price were higher. This
authorization, while apparently never actually utilized, provoked vocal opposition,
particularly from such regions as the rapidly industrializing South, where new in-
dustry was being established in response to lower labor and material costs. The
opposition, aided by lingering doubt as to the statutory authority and perhaps even
doubt as to the constitutional basis of DMP-4 ,58 forced passage, as a rider to the 1954
" Regions experiencing severe unemployment are classified by the Department of Labor into two basic
categories, "Areas of Substantial and Persistent Labor Surplus" and "Areas of Substantial Labor Surplus,"
with the former receiving contract-award preference over the latter. See 32 C.F.R. § a.8ox-2(a) and§ 1.804-1(b) (Supp. 1963).
TB Dec. 18, i95o.
BO "Background of Defense Manpower Policy No. 4 in Operation," Minutes of Office of Defense
Mobilization, Executive Office of the President, Oct. 1, 1952.
"i National Manpower Mobilization Policy, Jan. 17, 1951, § 7(I). See generally Dillon, Channeling
Government Contracts Into Depressed Areas, 16 Tim Ws-rrERN POLMCAL Q. 279 (1963).
"I §3(b), 62 Stat. 23 (1958). A nearly identical provision continues in force today, § 23o5(b),
7oA Stat. 130 (1956), as amended, io U.S.C. § 2305(c) (958).
su 31 DEcs. Comtp. GEN. 279 (1952). See Maness, The Emergence of the Current Interest in the
Defense, Small Business and Labor Surplus Area Subcontracting Programs, 18 MILITARY L. Rav. 1xg,
134-35 n.5o (1962); also Dillon, supra note 81, at 280 and 280 n.7.
"L "Placement of Procurement and Facilities in Areas of Current or Imminent Labor Surplus," 17 Fed.
Reg. 1196 (952).
BB See Miller, Government Contracts and Social Control: A Preliminary Inquiry, 41 VA. L. REV. 27,
41-42 (1955). For a recent attack on the legality of set-aside procurement, both labor surplus and" srnall
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,Defense Appropriations Act, of a provision which prohibited "payment of a price
differential ...for the purpose of relieving economic dislocations."'8 A similar
provision has been re-enacted every year since."' Also abolished was the con-
.comitant policy of bid-matching, whereby a firm in a labor surplus area could obtain
a contract for the entire requirement of any one procurement by matching the best
"outside" offer. Substituted was the present approach-the system of "partial
set-asides."
Under this system a specified portion of the quantity desired is reserved for
exclusive negotiation with firms in labor surplus areas, provided certain conditions are
met. The authority for negotiation, rather than formal advertising, is derived prin-
cipally from exceptions (i) and (i6) of the seventeen exceptions to formal advertising
in the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947. s. These two exceptions refer to
purchases (i) under a declared national emergency (existing now) and (16) for the
maintenance of the mobilization base of national defense in case of an emergency.
In determining the feasibility of making this partial set-aside, the contracting officer
must decide that "the procurement is severable into two or more economic production
runs or reasonable lots [and that]. one or more labor surplus area concerns are
expected to have the technical competency and productive capacity to furnish a
severable portion ...at a reasonable price," 9 which now can be no higher than
the highest price awarded on the unreserved portion. 0 Because of this last require-
ment, firms in labor surplus areas are considered for negotiation only if their bids
on the reserved portion are at a unit price within i2o per cent of the highest un-
reserved portion awarded.91 These set-asides enjoy preference over the small
business set-asides; and "in case of a tie bid, a firm located in a labor surplus area is
given preference, even though the procurement may not have been set aside for
labor-surplus area firms."92
The subcontracting program is considered to be the most important method of
furnishing procurement assistance to labor surplus areas. 3  Under DMP-4 all pro-
business, see McClelland, supra note 57, at 448-56. He states that "the legislative history of the
national emergency exception ... clearly shows that it is designed not to permit the payment of price
differentials or to promote socio-economic objectives b . . hut solely to provide procedures .. . requiring
... action at the time the emergency is declared as not to permit the delay incident to advertising." Id.
at 449-
"67 Stat. 357 (1953).
'
1 See, e.g., Dep't of Defense Appropriation Act, 1964, § 523, 77 Star. 254.
"§ 2.3o4(a)(I), (16), 7oA Stat. 128 (1956), 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1), (16) (1958). See generally
SUBCOMM. ON RETAILING, DISrRIBUTION, AND MARKETING PRACTICES, SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL
BUSINESS, 88TH CONG., isT SEss., REPORT ON IMPACT OF DEFENSE SPENDING ON LABOR SURPLUS AnItEm
12"13 (Comm. Print I963) [heicinafter cited as HUMPHREY REPORT].
so32 C.F.R. § 1.8o4-1 Gi-(i'i) (I6I), as amended, 32 C.F.R. § 1.804-1(a)(ii) (Supp. 1963). This
last amendment liberalized the former requirement allowing a set-aside only if two or more concerns
met the qualifications, but in the process removed one more cloak of competitive bidding.
go32 C.F.R. § 1.802 (I96i).
9",32 C.F.R. § S.804 -2(b) (Supp. 1963).
91 HUmsPmy REPORT 8.
" "Approximately half of all prime contracts for military hard goods are sub-contracted ... "
PROCUR.EMENT TRENDS at iv.
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curement agencies must encourage, though with few exceptions they cannot force,
prime contractors to award subcontracts to firms performing a substantial portion
of the contract in these areas. The prime contractors, in contracts valued between
$5,ooo and $5ooooo, undertake "the simple obligation of using [their] best efforts"
to place subcontracts with manufacturing concerns having one-half of their contract
costs in areas of substantial unemployment.9 4 Contracts over $5oo,ooo require a
"Labor Surplus Subcontracting Program" clause similar to, the small business sub-
contracting clauseY5
As thus organized and with the congressional admonition that "the procurement
agencies energetically implement [DMP-4 ] by assuring that firms in distressed areas
participate to the maximum extent .. .'" the program superficially appears to be a
positive cure. However, like many panaceas for economic shortcomings, it apparently
has been far less than successful in achieving its principal objective. While it may
be impossible to measure accurately the effectiveness of efforts to channel contracts
into depressed areas owing to the complex of shifting factors and economic im-
ponderables, the following figures portray a definite trend and force the conclusion
that this program has failed to attain even its initial objective of reorienting a sig-
nificant percentage of government procurement contracts towards the unutilized
sectors of the labor market. Although the present unemployment rate of 5.5 per
cent97 obviously is due principally to factors other than failure of the labor surplus
preference program, the figures on the percentage of government contracts in these
areas clearly demonstrate that, at the least, the program has not mitigated the ex-
tremely uneven distribution of contracts between regions of relative full employment
and those with serious unemployment. In fiscal 1962 only four per cent of all the
prime defense contracts were placed in areas of persistent and substantial labor
surplus, while less than thirty per cent were located in areas of substantial labor
surplus. More importantly, only 0.24 per cent of these contracts in persistent and
substantial labor surplus areas and o.42 per cent in substantial labor surplus areas
were the resultant of set-asides-and these figures represent a decrease since fiscal
196i0"
Several causes have been suggested for this surprisingly low percentage, including
the elimination of total set-asides by disallowance of a price differential, a shift in the
work force "from several types of employment to engineering employment,"9 9 and
the reluctance on the part of officials charged with the program's implementation.
It is probably true that "at the operating level the officials with the authority to make
32 C.F.R. § 1.805-2 (Supp. x963).
'
5 1d. at § 1.805-3.
"'Hearings on Area Redevelopment-r96z Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 59 (I965).
VT The 5.9 per cent rate of a year ago has dropped, reaching a sixteen month low of 5.4 per cent in
February 1964. Wash. Post, March 7, 1964, § A,-p. 4, col. 4.
* HuzmpiEy RFPORT 27.
"Id. at 4.
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awards and set-asides . . . were frequently too busy, too satisfied with established
routine, and too apt to select well-known producers to bother with the extra work
involved in partial set-asides which might be awarded to an unknown firm and might
require extra surveying and examination."100  Likewise, it may be that the shift in
the type of goods being purchased by the Defense Department-from tank-
automotive vehicles, weapons, ammunition, and production equipment to missiles,
electronic equipment, and research and development contracts-has caused a shift
in the work force towards engineering employment.10 1 The chief villain, however,
appears to be the restriction annually imposed by Congress in section 523 of the
Defense Department Appropriations Act "that no funds herein appropriated shall
be used for the payment of a price differential on contracts ... for the purpose of
relieving economic dislocations."10 2 This provision severely handicaps the program
since the partial set-aside which currently is used requires that the total quantity of
goods to be bought must be divisible into two or more economic production runs.
"'The variation in quantity requirements is such that the percentage which can be
divided will never be large enough to make this system a technique of major sig4
nificance."' s3 One of the more vocal critics, Senator Hubert Humphrey, recently in-
troduced an amendment to the fiscal year 1964 Defense Department appropriations
bill to initiate a program of total set-asides comparable to that of the small business
program.104 However, despite an impressive list of co-sponsors, the amendment
failed.
Though total set-asides, particularly if used in conjunction with the recent recom-
mended procedures for stepping-up the subcontracting program,10 undoubtedly
will increase the percentage of prime contracts awarded to these areas, just how large
an increase is difficult to predict. A main obstacle to increased dispersion under
this program is the change in the types of goods purchased by the Defense Depart-
ment. Particularly significant is the increased role of research and development,
a trend almost certain to continue. These contracts, for a variety of reasons, have
been concentrated heavily in states with average unemployment,'00 such as California
(forty per cent of the research and development contracts awarded in fiscal year
1962), New York (eleven per cent), and Massachusetts (six per cent),'10  while the
East North-Central states, experiencing fairly severe unemployment, have "lost"
6.i billion dollars in total defense contracts since the Korean military action.'08
100 Dillon, supra note 8i, at 287-89.
'o See HUMPHREY REPORT 4-1
o
2Dep't of Defense Appropriation Act, 1964, § 523, 77 Stat. 254.
.0. Hearings on Impact of Defense Spending on Labor Surphs Areas Before the Senate Select Comm.
on Small Business, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1962) (remarks of Ronald M. Linton, Director of Economic
Utilization Policy, Dep't of Defense).
104 H.R. 7179, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963).
'
0 0
ee HUMPHREY REPORT 14-24 (a list of over 30 recommendations by the Humphrey Subcomm.).
10' See PROCUREMENT TRENDS at vi; also I09 CONG. Rac. 14304 (daily cd. Aug. 15, x963) (listing of
areas of persistent and substantial labor surplus-compare Michigan, 43, with California and New York,
ii each).
""
7 BACKGROUND MATERIAL 41-42.
1
sHUt.PHREY REPORT 5.
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The subcontracting program has to date apparently enhanced "the selective dis-
tribution of government contract funds, rather than spread them uniformly around
the country"'0 9 for the same reasons that the small business subcontract program
has failed to achieve its desired objective. The Pacific region received not only 26.9
per cent of military prime contracts in fiscal year 1961 but also 424 per cent of the
subcontracts let by prime contractors' facilities." 0
Of course, the proposed total set-aside program is intended to offset this by pro-
viding for negotiated contracts and a government-supervised reallocation. As
pointed out above, this might not be effective. More significant, however, is the
probable result if total set-asides are initiated and are successful. The cost to the
Defense budget is bound to be increased and the basic procurement objective of
highest quality at lowest possible price thwarted, because of the utilization of
resources shown previously to be inefficient. Also, importantly, any increase in
the scope of the program will certainly add to the additional administrative costs
incurred in activating and continuing the labor surplus program. The largest per-
centage of such costs are directly traceable to the added personnel.
Senator Humphrey argues that "total set-asides are no more likely to result in
the payment of a price differential than negotiated contracts. . . .,"" Assuming this
to be true, it demonstrates merely that total set-asides for labor surplus will continue
to frustrate the aim of lower defense costs through competitive bids as much as do
negotiated bids. Furthermore, the utilization of older, existing facilities prevents the
replacement of obsolescent plant equipment. As the post-World War II resurgence
of the German iron, steel, and shipbuilding industries demonstrates, where very large
scale adjustments are necessary, it is often more expensive and time-consuming to
replace existing facilities with more advanced equipment (i.e., in the Mid-West)
than to start anew from the ground up (as in California). Additionally, since many
of the new employment positions must be filled by engineers, or skilled workers,
and not unskilled or semi-skilled, the reallocation may add to the unemployment
figures rather than subtract. The lack of skilled manpower, especially engineers-
one of the reasons for the shift to California, and so forth-will still exist in the labor
surplus areas and severely handicap efficient research and development and even
production. Though Congress has taken recent steps to retrain, through section
sixteen of the Area Redevelopment Act" 2 and the Manpower Development and
Training Act of 1962,"' these ameliorative measures hardly seem sufficient, at least
immediately, to offset the lack of highly skilled workers.
Moreover, if the small business program is viewed as compatible with the ultimate
200 2 STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITuTE, THE INDUSTRY-GOVERNMENT AEROSPACE RELATIONsHIP, MAY 1963,
at 58 (unpublished) (prepared for Aerospace Industries Ass'n of America, Inc.).
... Id. at 58 (Table D-III).
'11 109 CONG. REC. 14304 (daily ed. Aug. 15, x963).
112 75 Stat. 58 (1961), 42 U.S.C. § 2513 (Supp. III, 1962). See H.R. REP. No. x86, 87 th Cong., xst
Sess. (1962).Ia 7 6 Stat 23 (1962), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2571-2620 (Supp. IV, 1963).
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aim of procurement policy, at least to the extent that a wider base with less con-
centration tends to lower purchasing costs, then inconsistency between it and the
labor surplus program resulting in at least partial frustration of the small business
program is a detriment to basic procurement policy' 14 That frustration does still
exist is evidenced by the priorities for set-asides which favor persistent labor surplus
area concerns, even if they are not small businesses, before favoring "outside" small
business concerns." 5 The labor surplus reduction program, therefore, may in appli-
cation favor concentration at the expense of wider dispersion and presumably to the
detriment of competition, which supposedly leads to lower procurement costs.
And lastly, it should be noted that the Armed Services Procurement Regulation
provides that when an entire industry is economically depressed, the Director of
Civil and Defense Mobilization, under authority of DMP-4 , may establish prefer-
ences on an industry-wide basis rather than geographic. l 6 Such a preference could
run counter to the dispersion of contracts to areas of labor surplus since an area
with distressed companies in one industry could be a non-labor surplus area as a
whole.
Whatever is the more desirable objective-maximum efficiency in government
procurement or maximum employment-it is clear that at present neither policy
is obtainable even in theory. The inability of government planners to predict the
result of the many diverse, obscure, and illusive factors that coalesce to produce a
given policy effect prevents this policy from ever attaining its full objective. A
fortiori when two policies tend toward conflicting results in theory, the attainment
of either objective becomes that much more difficult. This is nowhere more evident
than in the area of the labor surplus preference program.
C. Protectionism and the Buy American Act
One of the most complex areas of governmental policy is that centering around
the procurement of foreign goods, whether for home or overseas consumption. Inter-
woven in this area are three diverse, and often either theoretically or practically con-
flicting, policies: the basic aim of procurement purchases-lowest possible price and
highest possible quality; the panorama of meanings and emotions attached to the
elusive phrase "free trade"; and "protectionism" as embodied in the Buy American
Act.
There is a paucity of meaningful statistics demonstrating the total increase in
procurement costs occasioned by protectionism, though numerous specific examples
exist. Most of the studies that have examined the Buy American Act vis-,a-vis free
trade have concentrated on a finding of inconsistency and the resultant economic
burden on the whole United States economy. However, the very fact that the act
114 See Maness, supra note 83, at 138, where he cites a 1952 file memorandum from the Oflicc of
Defense Mobilization expressing concern that the small business set-aside program "might be upset if
large concerns within distressed areas received priority over small concerns outside such areas,"
115 32 C.F.R. S 1.8o 4 -2(b) (Notice of Labor Surplus Area Set-Aside) (Supp. 1963).
lie32 C.F.R. § s.8o6-i (rg6i).
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favors higher domestic bidders over foreign suppliers indicates that government
purchasers procure less efficiently, in an economic sense, under the operation of these
policies. Granting this, the proponents of protectionism nevertheless contend that
the interests of national security and the goal of full employment, among others,
argue for continuation of protectionism.
Nationalism, combined with widespread unemployment and underselling of
domestic goods by foreign goods and buttressed by plausible arguments that national
security dictates military procurement domestically to insure the availability of
replacement parts, and so on, provides the impetus for legislation similar to the Buy
American Act of 1933. n7 Its sponsors were motivated by at least four, not necessarily
complementary, desires. They were primarily concerned with relief from the un-
employment of the Depression and concurrently interested in placing dampers on
German competition in the domestic heavy electric equipment industry. Addi-
tional motivation was readily supplied by a retaliatory desire against foreign
"buy-at-home" policies and by the discovery of a loophole in an existing Buy Ameri-
can statute"" that, supposedly erroneously, allowed the Postmaster General to avoid
favoring the domestic cotton industry."' Not surprisingly the most vociferous
present proponents of the Buy American Act are the diverse sections of domestic
industry desiring protection from the inroads of cheaper foreign goods. 20
Essentially, the act prohibits the government from procuring foreign raw mate-
rials or manufactured articles for domestic use. There are four primary exceptions:
if the foreign goods are purchased for off-shore use; or if domestic materials or
products do not exist in "reasonably available commercial quaritities"; or where the
head of the procuring agency determines either that domestic procurement is in-
consistent with the public interest or that the domestic cost is unreasonable.' 2'
The exceptions for unavailable quantity or quality have "not given rise to any
controversy or difficulty."' 22 The off-shore procurement exception is of tangential
concern here. Similarly the "public interest" exception, though a catchall phrase
incapable of precise definition and thus broad enough to include all the other
express exceptions (unreasonable cost, unavailability, or impracticality), has re-
mained relatively quiescent. It should be noted, however, that this exception has
become more important lately, being utilized, for instance, as a basis for the pro-
11747 Stat. 1520 (1933)
, 
as amended, io U.S.C. § zo (1958), as amended, io U.S.C. § io(c), (d)
(Supp. III, 1962).
"
8 The Treasury-Post Office Appropriation Act, 1933, 47 Stat. 580, 604 (1932).
... See Gantt & Speck, Domestic v. Foreign Trade Problems in Federal Government Contracting:
Buy American Act and Executive Order, 7 J. Pua. L. 378, 379 (r958).
'1It has also been argued that the United States' loses tax revenue 'vhen a bid is awarded to a
foreign firm, see to6 CONG. Rac. 17528 (196o) (remarks of Representative Dent), and that domestic
buying has a multiplier effect on wages and consumer buying, see 105 CONG. REc. io867-68 (1959)
(remarks of Representative Simpson).
... See generally Gantt & Speck, supra note zig, at 384-96.
"" Knapp, The Buy American Act: A Reviev and Assessment, .61 CoLtJM. L. REv. 430, 43 1 (i961).
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vision of the Armed Services Procurement Regulation that treats Canadian end-
products as domestic end-products not subject to the act's restrictions. 23
The chief controversy has concerned the "unreasonable cost" exception 12 4 as a
source of relief for foreign sellers desiring government contracts. In 1934, the
Treasury Department by circular letter fixed the test of reasonableness at twenty-five
per cent differential."2 5  Twenty years later Executive Order No. io582120 lowered
the differential to six per cent (or ten per cent excluding import duty and costs in-
curred after arrival in the United States) .'2 The practical effect of this liberalization
has been blunted, however, by section five of the executive order permitting the
agency head some discretion over a determination of what constitutes unreasonable-
ness. This provision recently has been interpreted by the Comptroller General as
allowing the Army to prefer a domestic supplier whose bid was nine per cent higher
even though the General Services Administration had refused preference to similar
domestic bids having a differential as low as seven per cent.128  Of greater sig-
nificance was the provision in the executive order allowing acceptance of a domestic
bid even though it exceeds the six per cent differential if the bid qualified under
any of three primary exceptions: (i) interest of national security; (2) assistance to
domestic small business; or (3) promotion of production in substantial unemploy-
ment areas. While at the same time the criterion for determining what constitutes
supplies manufactured "substantially all" from United States supplies was greatly
liberalized from twenty-five per cent, as demanding labeling as foreign, to fifty per
cent, these three exceptions mitigated against the order's supposed objective to remove
the Buy American Act's stringent provisions.'0 For example, the unemployment
exceptions, though discretionary on the surface, later became rigidly fixed at a differ-
ential of twelve per cent as opposed to the basic six.'80
There has been widespread condemnation of these restrictions on many grounds,
including their conflict with liberal trade policies and injury to the relations between
the United States and its allies. The point stressed here is the increase in costs 1 '
An unpublished 196o survey demonstrated not only the exceedingly low level of
123"32 C.F.R. § 6.xo3-5 (I96i), as amended, 32 C.F.R. § 6.io3-5(a) (Supp. 1963). The validity of
this provision was sustained under the Armed Services Procurement Regulation, Comp. Gen. Op. No.
B-I5OI83 , April 17, 1963, and under the Buy American Act, Comp. Gen. Op. No. B-z.5898, Aug. 22,
1963.
2
'Buy American Act § 2, 47 Stat. 1520 (1933), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § ioa (i958). See 32 C.F.R.
§§ 6.03-3, 6.104-4 (i96i).
12Branch of Supply, Procurement Division, Treasury Department, Circular Letter No. 6, March 3,
1934, and Circular Letter No. 37, June 20, 1934.
12 i9 Fed. Reg. 8723 (1954).
"" But if the bid is less than $25,ooo, "the sum shall be determined by computing ten per centum of
such price exclusive only of applicable duty." Ibid.
128 Comp. Gen. Op. No. B-15o 4 71, April 30, 1963.
" 123 Some critics have contended that Exec. Order No. xo582 is "in conflict with the letter and spirit
of the Buy American Act." 107 CoNG. REc. 9198 (I961) (remarks of Representative Shelley).
1202 i96 oGov'T CONT. REP. 32616.
121 Several years ago the staff of the Randall Commission estimated that roughly Sxoo million dollars
might be saved through elimination of the Buy American restrictions. STAF'F PAPERs 318 (Comm'n
on Foreign Economic Policy 1954). See also Knapp, supra note 122, at 458-62.
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foreign procurement ($39 million out of a total procurement by ten agencies of
$22 billion) but that the direct and indirect savings were considerable 3 2 In addi-
tion to outright savings by acceptance of lower foreign bids, their presence tends
to drive down the price of domestic bids, as was graphically demonstrated in the
electric equipment industry, particularly by the Chief Joseph cases'3 3
IV
EXTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES
A. The Antitrust Laws
The basic objectives of government procurement ostensibly enhance the attain-
ment of the goals of the antitrust laws. As stated in the report of the Attorney
General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, "the general objective
of the antitrust laws is promotion of competition in open markets . .. the goal
of competition provides powerful and pervasive incentives for product innovations
and product development, and for long-run cost-reduction."'3 4  Since the basic
objective of government procurement is purchase at the lowest possible cost and the
highest possible quality, procurement officials should be similarly desirous of pre-
serving competition as a means of obtaining low prices. Two tenets of procurement
policy are the preferences for formal advertising over negotiation and for a broadly-
based supplier program. Competitive bids are said to lower cost by twenty-five
per cent and to increase the "probability of small business participation."'3 5
In practice, however, the operation of the procurement program often results
in a lessening of competition. The Federal Property Act itself indicates the limit
that the government places on permissible competition: "[I]nvitations for bids shall
permit such full and free competition as is consistent with the procurement of types
of supplies and services necessary to meet the requirements of the agency con-
cerned."'13  The desire for high quality, certainty of supply, and speed of delivery
often dictate an abandonment of procurement in the open market. Other govern-
ment policies, such as Buy American legislation, small business and labor surplus
preferences, and access to patent monopolies through government contracts, also
minimize competition'
3 7
""
5Exec. Dep't Survey of Operations under Exec. Order No. 10582, 196o (unpublished) (cited and
explained by Knapp, supra note 122, at 450).
13' See, e.g., Knapp, supra note 122, at 435-43.
"O'ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE ANTTrrusT LAws, REPORT I, 316
(955) [hereinafter cited as ATrr'y GEN. REPORT].
I DOUGLAS REPORT 3.
... Federal Property and Administrative Services Act § 303, 63 Stat. 395, 41 U.S.C. § 253 (1958);
see also Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 § 3(b), 10 U.S.C. § 2305(a) (1958).
157 See also the exemption from the antitrust laws and the Federal Trade Commission Act granted
in certain instances to small businesses forming a joint-venture corporation, Small Business Act § 7(a) (6),
72 Stat. 388 (1958), 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(6) (1958).
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The chief thrust of the Sherman 88 and Clayton acts'8 0 is to assure freedom of
trade and commerce among the states by prohibiting unreasonably restrictive business
practices. Such aims are best served by the widest possible dispersion of industrial
power. Though the advocates of so-called "fair competition," as opposed to "work-
able competition," might under certain conditions allow oligopolistic concentration,
the ultimate goal, admittedly unobtainable, is pure competition-the existence of an
unfettered market with such a multitude of buyers and sellers that no one can
unduly influence the market price. 140  However, the entrance of the government
as a buyer severely limits the opted-for dispersion of buyers, especially in the
purchase of goods and services suitable solely for governmental or very specialized
consumption. Since the antitrust limitations on monopoly, and mergers, do not
apply to the federal government,141 prevention of monopolistic trends resulting from
federal procurement programs must be approached from the seller's side only.
It has been restated only recently that "antitrust is our strongest and most con-
sistent governmental means of maintaining market competition." '42  To that end
antitrust enforcement has concentrated on antimerger provisions. Commencing
with its i95o amendments to section seven of the Clayton Act, 43 Congress has
attempted to inhibit the tendency for large corporations to merge as a means to
"cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency.' 44 The Supreme Court
has exhibited a similar concern focusing, at least in the Brown Shoe".. decision, on
maintenance of the small competitors' market position.46 A supposed requisite to
a freely competitive market and an index of its existence in any given sector or in-
dustry is ease of entry by new firms. Government procurement practices would
appear to forestall easy entry, particularly where negotiation is the rule. While some
assert that in a few fields of military procurement, specifically air weapons systems,
newly formed companies have enjoyed a measure of success, this can be traced pri-
marily to the high rate of technological change obviating the advantages of experi-
ence and existent production facilities usually held by established firms, and
secondarily to the fact that most of the new entrants are "joint-ventures" or sub-
sidiaries of large, diversified, and wealthy corporations.' 47
123 26 Stat. 209 (189o), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (r958).
23938 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. -5§ I2-27 (1958), as amended, z5 U.S.C. §§ 13, 21
(Supp. III, 1962),
20 "The essence of full monopoly power resides in being the sole source of a product, so that the
buyer must meet the seller's terms or go without ... The same considerations apply where the problem
is a buyer's monopoly." .Ar'y GEN. REPORT 318.
211 See note 45 supra.
"' Grether, Consistency in Public Economic Policy with Respect to Private Unregulated Industries,
53 Am. Ecotw. REv. PAPERS A" PGCoEDIrS 26, 32 (1963) (Papers and Proceedings of the 75th Annual
Meeting of the American Economic Association, Pittsburgh, Pa., Dec. 27-29, x962).1,364 Stat. 1125 (195o), 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 2Z (1958), as amended, x5 U.S.C. S 2s (Supp. III 1962).
,44S. REP. NO. 1775,.Sst Cong., ;d S€8s. 4 (1950).
"'5Brown Shoe Co. v. United Sta5es, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). See 31 GEo. WMH. L. REV. 504 (x963).
1
'
8 See remarks of feseW,.. -arkham, il 53 Am. Eco,. REv. PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 57 (x963).
.. PECK & SCHERER,, .THE WEAPONS ACQulsrTioN PROCESS: AN EcoNomic ANALYSIS 195, 198-203
(196).
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Small business preferences and formal advertising are partly a response to the
need for additional measures to buttress the antitrust provisions. That these pre-
ventive measures have not forestalled concentration.. 8 has been noted previously.
Also noted were the inhibitions to maximum efficiency caused by the small business
and labor surplus set-asides, which appear to operate contrary to the assumption,
underlying the Robinson-Patman Act's admonition against price discrimination, that
the objective of maintaining an economy with as many competing units as is
efficiently possible is best served by forbidding favoritism to those who contribute
no efficiency. Blame also can be placed partly upon: the piecemeal transfer of some
portions of the economy from the unregulated to the regulated public utility sectors,
partially accomplished through government contracting as in the atomic energy
field; government subsidies total and partial which, as demonstrated by the farm
commodity price support programs, may increase the economic disparity between
large and small producers; state and municipal restrictive licensing procedures in-
tended to limit competition. The variegated factors of weapons procurement, re-
search and development, negotiation, necessity for technical expertise and reliability
plus the immeasurable but significant effects of "pork-barreling" and regional
favoritism have all combined to produce concentration directly through the govern-
ment procurement mechanism. This concentration is antithetical to the expressed
objectives of the antitrust laws.
In conclusion, then, the federal contracting program, whatever may have been
the intention of Congress, runs counter to the spirit, and perhaps the letter, of the
antitrust laws. It may well be that, as Adolf Berle and David Lilienthal, among
others, have been saying, "big business is here to stay" and, further, that "big
business is good for the nation"; nevertheless, we must think clearly on this question
of the nature and type of economy that is desired. Such thinking does not seem
to be evident today in the halls of government, save perhaps where governmental
policies reflect a bias in favor of big business on the part of key decision-makers-
for the most impeccable reasons, of course, national security.
B. "Free Trade"
Since at least as far back as the 1934 Trade Agreements Act 1 ' 9 and the negotiation
of "reciprocal trade" agreements, the professed goal of United States officials has been
"free multilateral trade." This policy constantly receives obeisance from economic
theoreticians, tariff negotiators, and congressional and administrative leaders:15
148 It should be caveated that a minority 'contend: "Over-all concentration [in the non-agricultural
sector] does not seem to have changed much since the pattern of high concentration . . . at the turn of
the century." Rosenbluth, The Trend in Concentration and Its Implications For Small Business, 24
LAw & CoTrrUMzl. PROB. 192, 204-05 (95). -
240 48 Stat. 943 (1934)-
..0 See generally Miller, Foreign Trade and the "Security State": A Study in Conflicting National
Policies, 7 J. PuB. L.37 (z958).
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The basic purpose of our foreign trade is to exchange goods produced efficiently in
the United States for goods which we can produce relatively less efficiently or not at all.
International trade lowers costs and raises standards of living both at home and abroad. 15 1
More recently the late President Kennedy stated in a 1962 message to Congress. 1 2
Once given a fair and equal opportunity to compete in oversea markets, and once subject
to healthy competition from oversea manufacturers for our own markets, American
management and labor will have additional reason to maintain competitive costs and
prices, modernize their plants, and increase their productivity. The discipline of the world
marketplace is an excellent measure of efficiency and a force to stability.
However, these statements are mainly hortatory. The United States throughout
its history has adhered in some degree to a protectionist policy; one need only
invoke the ghost of Alexander Hamilton to illustrate the point. Accordingly, there
is a "basic ambivalence between professed aim and actual operational facts"1"" in
American foreign economic policy. With respect to federal contracting, again the
Buy American Act may be cited, this time to underscore the point that some in-
consistency exists between contracting policy and the purported aims of external
policy. Just as that act runs counter to the policy of procuring at the lowest possible
cost, so it conflicts with the desire to have closer trading relations with other nations.
It may be that protectionism is not economically unsound for the total domestic
economy, but what is clear is that when combined with government contracting it
contributes to higher procurement costs and undermines free trade. As a partial
offset the United States has initiated an extensive offshore procurement program to
purchase foreign military supplies for the overseas use of American military forces
and allied or friendly nations under the provisions of the 1954 Mutual Security Act.15 4
Nevertheless, the total effect of Buy American, required preferences for United
States shipping even at higher costs, the national security provision of the Trade Acts
et al. is to subvert national free trade efforts. When the federal government itself
is forced to prefer less efficient domestic producers, manufacturers, or shippers, it
becomes difficult to persuade threatened domestic industries that they should submit
to increased and equal foreign competition. This is an area where the government
should lead by example.
C. Other Federal Policies
One other example will serve to indicate a further dimension to external in-
consistency: Federal contracts have been used at times to circumvent certain statutes.
Noteworthy here is the manner in which the "contracting-out" system enables
scientists and others to be employed by private concerns at salary rates higher than
... COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADvisRs, ANNUAL REPORT 92-93 (I963).
... President John F. Kennedy, Message to Congress on Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program, Jan.
25, 5962, Io8 CONG. Rac. 904, 952-53 (x962).
... Miller, supra note I5O, at 39.
-- 68 Stat. 832 (19.54) as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 5750-1951. See Exec. Order No. 10575, 19 Fed.
Reg. 7249 (1954). See generally Pasley, Offshore Procurement, 18 MILITARY L. Rlv. 55 (1962).
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those permitted by the federal pay scales. Thus one who, if he was in the federal
bureaucracy, would be paid at a certain rate and would be entitled to the perquisites
of his office, when employed by a "private" concern whose only raison d'etre is to
perform government contracts, receives higher pay and greater fringe benefits.
Furthermore, manpower ceilings imposed by Congress are neatly evaded. The
contracting-out program, however it may be justified on the grounds of necessity,
is to that extent blatantly inconsistent with the letter and spirit of federal statutes.
For unknown reasons, this has not caused undue concern in Congress, although
hearings held in the late i95os contain both testimony illuminating the practice and
statements of displeasure by individual congressmen.' Possibly, this lack of interest
may be attributed to a feeling that contracting-out is working tolerably well in that
it permits the federal government to receive services not available to it in the
federal bureaucracy. The net result, however, is an expansion of this bureaucracy
to double its supposed size if the employees of "private" firms, profit and nonprofit,
whose only customer is the federal government, are included. It is these millions
who may be said to be the rank-and-file of the military-industrial complex discussed
above. It is their paychecks which swell the economies of such states as California,
Arizona, and Massachusetts. (And, incidentally, it is their votes which help to keep
a given congressman in office.)
Another example may be the legality of the Power Development Reactor Program
of the Atomic Energy Commission. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 contained this
provision:1
56
Section i69.- No Subsidy. No funds of the Commission shall be used in
the construction or operation of facilities licensed under section io3 or section
104 except under contract or other arrangement entered into pursuant to
section 3L
In other words, section 169 prohibited use of AEC funds in the construction or
operation of privately owned nuclear reactors, except as might be authorized under
section thirty-one. Section thirty-one authorized the AEC to make contracts for
the conduct of research and development in a number of specified areas, including
"industrial uses, the generation of usable energy, and the demonstration of the
practical value of utilization of production facilities for industrial or commercial
purposes."
The main legal question was whether the Commission could enter into research
and development contracts for section 104 licenses under which AEC funds would
be used to assist in the construction of power reactors. The AEC said yes, but the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy disagreed. One astute observer stated that,
despite section i69, "it is true, of course, that the Program ... involves a subsidy in
"' See, for example, House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, Contracting Out Government
Responsibility for Administrative, Management, and Other Services, H.R. REP. No. 688, 86th Cong., ist
Sess. (1959); Miller, supra note 3, at 976-90; Dupre & Gustafson, supra note 25.
"" 68 Stat. 952 (1954).
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h very real sense, but it is a subsidy which reduces loss rather than one which provides
even a hope of profit."' 7 If that conclusion is accurate, then it furnishes another
example of administrative circumvention of a statute by contract. However, the
meaning of section 169 is disputed and thus it is not as clear a case of the circum-
vention of a statute by federal contracts as is our other illustration.
V
By WAY OF CONCLUSION
Enough perhaps has been said to indicate some of the contours of the federal
contract as a device of great flexibility which in its total impact has important con-
sequences for the manner in which the values of the American people are shaped
and shared. The government contract system, as Dr. Carl F. Stover has put it, is
a "problem in public policy." It is "one of the truly significant governmental in-
ventions of this century."'50 As the legal technique for welding together a new
partnership between governmental and nongovernmental agencies in the perform-
ance of public functions, contract permits crucial social needs to be met and paid
for out of the public treasury; at the same time, an attempt is made to preserve the
privateness of American enterprise (and nonprofit organizations). The enormous
social utility of contract cannot be overemphasized, even though the attempt to main-
tain the private character of the public contractor has not been very successful.
Even so, the system also raises serious problems of public policy, not the least of
which is the extent to which it runs counter to other policies and programs as well as
basic democratic values. The social usefulness of the federal contract should not bar
continuing analyses in political and economic terms. Legal analysis alone, as im-
portant as it is and as great a need as there may be, will not suffice for the task.
The consistency question has become acute with the advent of the Positive State.10
At one time perhaps, when government was relatively quiescent and had not yet
undertaken the affirmative responsibilities that American government now has
accepted, inconsistency in policy and program could not only be tolerated; it could
even be welcomed as a form of that diversity which underlies and exemplifies the
American commitment to freedom. But that time is now in the past. Big govern-
ment is here, doubtless to stay, whatever one's personal preferences may be. If that
is accepted, and it seems that there is an American consensus on the need for massive
governmental interventions into socioeconomic affairs, then incongruity among
policies no longer is tolerable. The need exists for means by which public policies
can be made consistent.
... Green, The Strange Case of Nuclear Power, 17 FED. BAR J. ioo, 112 (1957).
.. Stover, The Government Contract System as a Problem in Public Policy, in 2 STANrFor R=sAurC
In sTnTTE, op. cit. supra note xo9, at 3.
"" The concept of the Positive State is suggested in Miller, The Public Interest Undefined, so J. Pun.
L, x84 (6x), and in Miller,,An Affirmative Thrust to Due Process of Law?, 30 Gao. WAsH. L. REV. 399
(1962). See Nutting, Some Reflections on the Positive State, 49 VA. L. REV. 729 (1963); Walden,
Antitrust in the Positive State, 41 TExAs L. REv. 741 (1963).
